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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper examines how the Irish carbon tax can be raised without increasing 
poverty and disproportionately affecting low-income households. It shows that 
poverty can in fact be reduced and the lowest-income fifth of households left 
better-off using a third of revenues from a carbon tax rise on targeted increases in 
welfare payments, as proposed in the recent Programme for Government. This 
reverses the regressive impact of an uncompensated carbon tax rise, which arises 
because goods subject to the carbon tax make up a larger share of spending for 
lower- than higher-income households.  
 
The lowest-income fifth of households is heavily comprised of working-age adults 
in receipt of social welfare payments and their dependents. These can be 
compensated for a rise in the carbon tax through increases in the maximum rates 
of the main working-age welfare payments or raising Increases for Qualified 
Children (IQCs) paid alongside these benefits to those with dependent children. 
We show that doing so using a third of the €159 million Revenue estimate that a 
€7.50 per tonne carbon tax increase raises would reduce the overall poverty rate 
by 0.2 percentage points (ppts) and leave the lowest-income fifth of households 
on average better-off. Using the revenue to increase IQCs would reduce the child 
poverty rate by twice that (0.4ppts): a substantial reduction, given Regan and 
Maître (2020) estimate child poverty could rise by 1.4ppts this year because of 
pandemic related job losses, even with some recovery. 
 
Policymakers may also be concerned about the impact an uncompensated carbon 
tax rise will have on single adults living alone. Using a third of revenues to raise the 
Fuel Allowance or Living Alone Increase is well targeted at compensating such 
households, though would not on its own reverse the regressive impact of a carbon 
tax rise. This is because much of the gain from such benefits goes to households 
around the middle rather than the bottom of the income distribution, reflected in 
lower rates of poverty among retired adults than working-age adults or children. 
However, using one-third of the revenue to fund a combined increase in IQCs and 
these benefits would be both progressive and poverty reducing. 
 
The Programme for Government also commits to allocating around half of the 
additional revenue raised from planned carbon tax increases over the next decade 
to a national housing retrofit programme. The paper provides an overview of the 
evidence from research on existing housing retrofit programmes administered by 
the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI), which finds significant variation 
in the level of grant aid provided relative to the energy efficiency gain. It also 
suggests that it would be prudent to incorporate funding for the evaluation of grant 
effectiveness into any new retrofit programme. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
There is a broad scientific consensus that the accumulation of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere – notably carbon dioxide – is causing global temperatures to rise 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014; 2018). While there is 
uncertainty about the precise economic and social costs associated with this rise 
in temperatures,1 the European Union has committed to achieving a 30 per cent 
reduction on 2005 emission levels by 2030, setting ambitious national targets for 
emissions reductions, including 20 per cent for Ireland by 2020 and 30 per cent by 
2030. In addition to these European Union and other international commitments, 
Ireland has set a national policy objective of transitioning to a low-carbon economy 
by 2050 (Government of Ireland, 2015; 2018; Department of Communications, 
Climate Action and Environment, 2014).  
 
Successive governments have envisaged a key role for a gradually rising carbon tax 
in meeting these objectives (Government of Ireland, 2007; 2011; 2018; 2020). By 
putting a price on carbon, the tax addresses the divergence between the private 
and social costs of emissions that lead to their excessive production in a market 
economy. Such taxes are easy to administer, cheap to collect and difficult to avoid 
(Metcalf, 2019). Moreover, a carbon tax is the most efficient way of incentivising 
carbon abatement; that is, of achieving a given reduction in carbon emissions at 
the lowest economic cost, with a large literature finding that such taxes would 
reduce emissions in Ireland with little wider economic costs (e.g. FitzGerald and 
McCoy, 1992; FitzGerald et al., 2002; Bergin et al., 2004; di Cosmo and Hyland, 
2013; Conefrey et al., 2013; de Bruin and Yakut, 2018; 2019).2 Even though few 
broad-based carbon taxes have been in place for long, there is now also substantial 
evidence from ex-post evaluations that they are highly effective at reducing 
emissions, particularly from transport (see, for example, Andersson, 2019; Runst 
and Thonipara, 2020; Metcalf and Stock, 2020; Best et al., 2020). 
 
However, there is also widespread recognition that carbon taxes can have 
distributional consequences that policymakers may be concerned about and want 
to ameliorate.3 This arises largely because certain groups – especially lower-




1  See Nordhaus (2007) and Stern (2006). Some have argued that uncertainty around these costs is itself an argument for 
taking action, analogous to taking out an insurance policy (Wagner and Weitzman, 2015). 
2  This goes back as far as Baumol and Oates (1971) and Weitzman (1974). See Metcalf (2019) for an accessible summary 
of this literature and discussion of arguments in favour of a carbon tax over cap-and-trade schemes, namely less 
administrative complexity, damaging price volatility and potential for adverse policy interactions.  
3  In an Irish context, recognition of this dates back to at least Scott (1992) and O’Donoghue (1997). More recently, 
Bercholz and Roantree (2019), Tovar-Reaños and Lynch (2019), Callan et al. (2009), Healy (2003) and Clinch and Healy 
(2000) have all examined the distributional impact of carbon taxes and potential compensation packages. This paper 
updates and develops that work by using the most recent available data to examine a broader range of reforms. 
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intensive goods, in particular heating fuel. As a result, a carbon tax can have a 
regressive impact on households in the absence of an accompanying package of 
compensation measures. Arising from such concerns, the present government 
indicated its intention to ‘ensure that the increases in the carbon tax are 
progressive’ by using around a third of revenues raised from planned increases in 
the carbon tax ‘on targeted social welfare and other initiatives’ (Government of 
Ireland, 2020). This study assesses the effects of a €7.50 per tonne rise in the 
carbon tax on households’ incomes and poverty in Ireland, with and without 
reforms to the tax and welfare system which compensate households.  
 
Chapter 2 sets out the methodology underlying the paper. This takes as given the 
behaviour of households and firms, abstracting from the wider effects on the 
economy such a tax may have.4 For example, we do not account for changes in 
prices – beyond those directly arising from the higher carbon tax – that firms 
charge for their products because of changes to input prices or processes, nor the 
responses of households to such changes in the relative prices of goods.5 This 
allows us to isolate the immediate effects of increasing the carbon tax on 
households’ incomes, identify the groups likely to be disproportionately affected 
without compensation and design reforms to offset these effects. The combined 
impact of these packages on poverty and households’ income are considered in 
Chapter 3. These show that it is possible to use a third of the revenues raised by an 
increase in the carbon tax to reduce poverty – particularly child poverty – and leave 
the lowest-income fifth of households better-off on average.  
 
In the longer run, both households and firms will respond to the change in relative 
prices brought about by the higher carbon tax by changing the goods and services 
they consume, produce and invest in.6 Given the Irish residential building stock has 
a relatively low level of energy efficiency and contributes around 15 per cent of 
total CO2 emissions, one area that will require particularly large investment is 
residential housing retrofits. The current government has proposed allocating 
€5 billion from the €9.5 billion in additional revenue that will be raised from 
increases to the carbon tax over the next decade towards a housing retrofit 
programme. Chapter 4 provides an overview of evidence from research on existing 
retrofit programmes administered by the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland 
(SEAI), which finds significant variation in the level of grant aid provided relative to 
the energy efficiency improvement gained. Chapter 5 concludes by considering the 




4  Research that takes account of such effects finds that higher carbon taxes reduce emissions with negligible impacts on 
the wider economy (e.g. de Bruin and Yakut, 2019; Conefrey et al., 2013; Bergin et al., 2004). 
5  In the medium to long run, these price effects may also change the returns to labour and capital. Research for the 
United States suggests that these ‘source-side’ impacts are progressive, and may even entirely offset the regressive 
‘use-side’ impacts even before compensation (Rausch et al., 2011; Horowitz et al., 2017; and Goulder et al., 2018). 
6  de Bruin and Yakut (2019c) and Tovar-Reaños and Lynch (2019) find – as here – that appropriate recycling of revenues 
can reverse the initial regressive impact of increases to the carbon tax even after accounting for changes in behaviour.  
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CHAPTER 2  
Methodology 
To investigate the impact an increase in the carbon tax will have on households, 
this paper uses SWITCH – the ESRI’s tax and benefit microsimulation model – run 
on data from the nationally representative 2017 Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC). Given the substantial impact of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic 
on the labour market, the 2017 data are adjusted to be representative of the 2020 
population. We do this by simulating an unemployment shock whereby a certain 
proportion of workers in each sector of the economy are assumed to lose their job 
or to continue in employment with the support of the Temporary Wage Subsidy 
Scheme (TWSS). The number of individuals affected by this shock is calibrated from 
publicly available Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection data on 
claims for the Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) and Revenue data on the 
number of recipients of the TWSS. Both calibrations use figures from the end of 
June and account for the industry breakdown of recipients of either scheme.7  
 
However, SILC does not collect sufficiently detailed information on expenditure to 
model the current or potential carbon tax liabilities of households. The Household 
Budget Survey (HBS) – which does collect such information – was most recently 
collected in 2015-2016 but does not contain sufficiently detailed information on 
incomes to allow tax and welfare entitlements to be modelled through SWITCH. As 
a result, we adopt an approach common in the microsimulation literature of 
imputing expenditure into SILC from the HBS.  
2.1 PROCEDURE FOR IMPUTING FUEL SPENDING INTO SILC 
Our approach to imputing expenditure on goods subject to carbon tax follows 
De Agostini et al. (2017), which has been previously applied in an Irish context by 
Savage (2017). The overall idea is straightforward; we model expenditure on goods 
liable to the carbon tax in the HBS using household and demographic 
characteristics, then take the estimated coefficients of this model and use the same 
characteristics in SILC to predict each household’s expenditure on goods liable to 
carbon tax. The details of this approach are described below. 
Step 1: Estimate non-durable expenditure  
The first step is to use the HBS data to estimate non-durable expenditure using an 
unconditional ordinary least squares (OLS) model as follows: 






7  For further details of this approach, see Beirne et al. (2020) and Regan and Maître (2020).  
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where ln𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 denotes the logarithm of non-durable expenditure (total spending 
less that on furniture, appliances and equipment), 𝑦𝑦 denotes disposable income, 𝒙𝒙 
is a vector of control variables, and 𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸 ,𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸 ,𝛾𝛾1,𝛾𝛾2 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛾𝛾3 are parameters to be 
estimated. Here, 𝑚𝑚 is set to 3. The parameters estimated from this model are used 
later in Step 4.  
 
The vector of control variables includes a range of demographic and household 
characteristics. Household characteristics include the following variables; 
household size, tenure of accommodation, family type, car ownership, the number 
of dependent children, the number of working members of the household, the 
number of rooms in the dwelling, the type of accommodation, and rural/regional 
indicators. 
 
Other household head (HRP) characteristics include work status, gender, age, 
education, and marital status. For the purposes of this specific step, the model also 
includes the interaction of each of these demographic and household 
characteristics with the logarithm of disposable income and its square.  
Step 2: Estimate budget shares of goods subject to the carbon tax 
The next step is to estimate the budget shares of electricity and goods subject to 
the carbon tax. Due to the large proportion of households that have zero 
expenditure on many of the five different types of fuel captured in the HBS (gas, 
liquid fuel, solid fuel, petrol and diesel), this estimation is done in two stages. 
 
The first stage estimates a probit model in order to calculate the probability of 
having non-zero expenditure: 
Pr(𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 = 1) = 𝜓𝜓(𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐,0 + �𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐,0(ln𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)𝑚𝑚 + 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐,0 𝒙𝒙+  𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐,0) 
𝑚𝑚
 
The dependent variable is the probability of having positive expenditure on a given 
fuel, 𝑐𝑐. The exponent of NDE, 𝑚𝑚, is set to 2, while the vector of covariates contains 
the same demographic and household characteristics as before.  
 
The second stage uses an OLS regression to estimate budget shares of non-durable 
expenditure for a given fuel, 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 =
𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸
, conditional on having positive expenditure 
for that fuel. 
wc = 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + �𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐(ln𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)𝑚𝑚 + 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐  𝒙𝒙 +  𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 = 1 
𝑚𝑚
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A second-order polynomial is again used for the expenditure term, while the 
control variables are the same as before. The estimated coefficients from both 
stages of this step are later used in Step 5. 
Step 3: Adjust the income distribution from SILC to match the HBS 
The distribution of disposable income from SILC is then adjusted in order to align 
it to the HBS data. We take the weekly disposable income for each household 
simulated by SWITCH under the baseline tax and welfare policy (described below) 
in 2015-2016 prices, then identify outliers in the distributions of disposable 
incomes in both the SILC and HBS datasets. This is done using the Chauvenet 
method for detecting outliers, an iterative procedure where an observation is 
marked as an outlier if it falls outside the criterion chosen. In this case, the criterion 
assumes a lognormal distribution: 
(𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝑦𝑦 −  𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝑦𝑦�����) /𝜎𝜎ln𝑦𝑦 > 𝑍𝑍(1−2𝑁𝑁)−1    
where  ln𝑦𝑦����� is the mean and 𝜎𝜎 is the standard deviation of disposable income. Once 
outliers have been identified, the distribution of disposable income is standardised 




� ∗ 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑦𝑦�𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 
Step 4: Impute non-durable expenditure 
Once the variables in the SILC dataset have been constructed such that they have 
the same structure as their HBS counterparts, non-durable expenditure is imputed 
into the SILC data. This simply involves taking the estimated coefficients from 
Step 1 above and the values of the variables to generate predicted values of non-
durable expenditure for each household in our SILC dataset.  
 
The independent variables for income, as well as their interactions with the control 
variables, are the adjusted series (from Step 3) and not the original series in the 
SILC dataset. This means that our imputation procedure accounts for the lower 
level of employment and disposable income in 2020 arising from pandemic related 
job losses, though it assumes the relationship between expenditure and these 
(along with other demographic variables) is the same as in 2015-2016. The 
resulting imputation of non-durable expenditure is then adjusted in the same 
manner as income in Step 3 before being used as a variable in the next step. 
Step 5: Impute budget shares 
In the same manner as the previous step, budget shares are imputed following the 
two-stage procedure using the estimates from Step 2. The non-durable 
expenditure variables and their polynomials are again the adjusted series rather 
than the original prediction.  
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Step 6: Calculate carbon tax liabilities 
For each household in our SILC data, we then have a predicted level of non-durable 
expenditure as well as the share of non-durable expenditure on five fuel types 
subject to the carbon tax. Simply multiplying the two gives us expenditure on each 
of the fuels. Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 show that the distributions of these 
imputed expenditures are similar to those reported in the HBS. 
 
To calculate the carbon tax paid by each household, the expenditure on each fuel 
type is divided by its price per unit in 2015/2016 to obtain an estimated quantity.8 
We then apply the rate of carbon tax levied on that fuel type to calculate the 
carbon tax liability paid by each household. Appendix Table A.3 shows that these 
closely approximate the distribution of carbon tax liabilities by income calculated 
using the same approach from reported expenditure.  
 
However, an important caveat that accompanies our modelling approach relates 
to changes in expenditure patterns since 2015-2016 when the HBS data we use 
were collected. Coffey et al. (2020) show that these changed substantially in the 
months following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with spending on 
transport, for example, falling by more than half. Statistics from the Sustainable 
Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI) show that although electricity, petrol and diesel 
demand were well below their 2019 levels in May of this year, kerosene – used for 
heating in households – was significantly higher.9 More generally, the energy 
efficiency of both cars and heating systems has improved significantly in recent 
years and such improvements will not be captured in the spending levels that we 
impute. As a result, we may overstate the impact of an increase in the carbon tax 
on certain groups (notably long-distance commuters who are currently working 
from home and those who have upgraded their home energy systems) and 
understate it on others (those spending more time in – and heating – energy 
inefficient homes).  
2.2 REFORMS 
Using this dataset, we consider the effects on households of a €7.50 per tonne 
increase in the carbon tax from its current level of €26 per tonne. Revenue estimate 
that such a rise would yield €159 million per annum on a full year basis.10 Given the 
current government has indicated its intention to ‘ensure that the increases in the 
carbon tax are progressive’ by using around a third of revenues raised from 




8  We use data on prices collected by the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland, taking the average weighted by share 
of household energy demand, as per de Bruin and Yakut (2019b).  
9  See https://www.seai.ie/publications/Tracking-effect-of-COVID-19-on-energy-demand.pdf. The SEAI notes that this 
may reflect households stocking up on fuel at the start of the pandemic and result in lower deliveries later in the year.  
10  See https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/documents/statistics/ready-reckoner.pdf.  
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initiatives’ (Government of Ireland, 2020), we examine the combined impact of a 
€7.50 increase in the carbon tax as part of the following seven reforms: 
A. a €4 per week rise in the Increase for Qualified Children paid to recipients 
of most social welfare benefits with dependent children (from €36/40 per 
week to €40/44 per week for children aged u12/12+ respectively); 
B. a €6.50 per week rise in the rate of fuel allowance, payable to long-term 
recipients of certain social welfare payments; 
C. a €3 per week rise in the maximum personal rate of the main working-age 
welfare payments, from €203 per week to €206 per week; 
D. a €28 per year increase in the personal income tax credit (€1,650 to 
€1,678); 
E. a €4.75 per week rise in the Living Alone Increase, an extra payment for 
people on social welfare payments who are living alone; 
F. a €4 per week rise in the u12 Increase for Qualified Children, €2.50 per 
week rise in the 12+ Increase for Qualified Children and €1 per week rise 
in the Living Alone Increase; 
G. a €4 per week rise in the u12 Increase for Qualified Children, €2.50 per 
week rise in the 12+ Increase for Qualified Children and €1.50 per week 
rise in the fuel allowance; 
 
Estimates from SWITCH suggest that – on a full year basis – each of these would 
cost €50-55 million per annum compared to the tax and welfare system currently 
in place and the population as it looked at the end of June 2020. 
 
We assume that households’ behaviour remains unchanged in response to a 
change in relative prices of goods/services and labour/leisure brought about by the 
rise in the carbon tax and any compensation package. This means the results are 
best interpreted as showing the initial ‘first round’ effects of the reforms 
considered. In the medium or longer run, individuals may adjust whether and how 
much they work, while households are likely to change the composition of their 
expenditure away from more carbon-intensive products towards less carbon-
intensive ones (De Bruin and Yakut, 2019). Although this may reduce the scale of 
losses relative to those estimated here, it is unlikely to alter the pattern of these 
losses unless the magnitude of responses also differs significantly by income level 
or household type. Other research published by the ESRI (Tovar-Reaños and Lynch, 
2019) suggests that this is unlikely to be the case, at least on the expenditure side. 
While little evidence is available on the extent of labour supply responses by 
income level and household type in Ireland, the reforms to taxes and benefits 
considered here are also unlikely to be of sufficient magnitude to induce 
substantial behavioural responses. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Results 
In this chapter we examine the impacts of the potential reforms outlined in 
Chapter 2. We first look at their effects on poverty, before turning to analyse their 
distributional impacts. We finish by examining their effect on various other groups 
that may be of particular interest to policymakers.  
3.1 POVERTY11 
The impact of a higher carbon tax on certain residential heating fuels has led some 
to worry about its possible effects on energy poverty, which the government 
defines as ‘an inability to heat or power a home to an adequate degree’ 
(Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources, 2016). However, 
measuring energy poverty is a difficult task beset by measurement issues and on 
which there is no agreed international approach.  
 
Some countries measure energy poverty as the proportion who spend more than 
a certain share of their disposable income on energy. But this can be very sensitive 
to the ultimately arbitrary income threshold used, and to whether disposable 
income is defined before or after housing costs (BHC and AHC income 
respectively).12 In addition, expenditure-based measures can include some high 
income households who heat their homes to a high level but exclude others whose 
incomes are so low that they decide to spend less than e.g. 10 per cent of their 
incomes on energy and leave their home inadequately heated.13 
 
This has led other countries, such as the UK, to define energy poverty on the basis 
of the estimated expenditure needed to heat a home adequately, rather than what 
households actually report spending. However, this approach requires detailed 
information on dwellings that may not be available, and is sensitive to the precise 
assumptions made about energy efficiency and sources. Partly for these reasons, 
other countries again have adopted subjective measures, based on questions 
asked in surveys about whether households have had to go without heating in the 
past 12 months, whether the dwelling was not kept adequately warm because of 
affordability issues, and whether the household was unable to pay utility bills on 




11  This section draws on the discussion in Bercholz and Roantree (2019).  
12  As the amount spent on housing in part reflects preferences for consumption, measuring disposable income after 
housing costs means treating a family who decide to live e.g. in a larger house with a garden as ‘poorer’ than a family 
with identical income but who live in a smaller house without a garden.  
13  Coyne et al. (2018) find evidence consistent with this in their study of an energy efficiency upgrade scheme in Ireland. 
This led to much smaller than expected energy savings, as households responded to the increased efficiency of their 
dwellings by increasing ‘thermal comfort’. 
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While all these metrics have been used in Ireland at some point, the 2011 Warmer 
Homes strategy put forward a ‘preliminary’ official definition based on reported 
expenditure (Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources, 
2011). This proposed a ‘core indicator’ of energy poverty defined as a household 
spending more than 10 per cent of its income after housing cost on energy services, 
and supplementary indicators of ‘severe’ and ‘extreme’ fuel poverty defined as 
spending more than 15 per cent and 20 per cent respectively.14  
 
Table 3.1 contains our estimate of these official measures in 2020, using the 
approach outlined in Chapter 2. Without compensation, a carbon tax increase of 
€7.50 per tonne would raise ‘core’ energy poverty from 17.5 per cent to 18.9 per 
cent, ‘severe’ energy poverty from 5.6 per cent to 6.1 per cent, and ‘extreme’ 
energy poverty from 3.0 per cent to 3.3 per cent. Some of the reforms we consider 
slightly moderate this increased level of energy poverty – particularly for the 
‘severe’ energy poverty measures, offsetting a fifth of the rise – but we simulate 
that in all cases energy poverty would be higher than without a rise in the carbon 
tax.  
 
However, these indicators are – as noted above – beset by measurements issues. 
Recent work by Tovar-Reaños and Lynch (2020) finds that such expenditure-based 
energy poverty metrics perform poorly both in measuring baseline rates of energy 
poverty and in capturing any changes to energy poverty from carbon taxation. In 
addition, Watson and Maître (2015) caution against the drawing of a distinction 
between ‘energy poverty’ and deprivation more generally. They argue that the 
‘problem of fuel poverty is primarily one of inadequate resources’ and that ‘its 
solution lies in understanding and addressing the constellation of factors that 
erode a household’s material well-being’.  
 
There is therefore a compelling case for focusing on the net impact of any rise in 
the carbon tax on more established measures of poverty, such as the official at-
risk-of-poverty rate. This records the percentage of people living in a household 
below the poverty line: that is, in a household with less than 60 per cent of median 
household income, adjusted for household size.  
 
Table 3.1 contains our estimate of this measure of poverty for the population as a 
whole, adults and children. The results show that it is possible to reduce poverty 




14  The subsequent 2016 Strategy to Combat Energy Poverty committed to establishing an Energy Poverty Advisory Group 
to review and report to the minister on ‘an appropriate methodology for measuring and tracking energy poverty levels 
in Ireland’. However, this group has yet to be convened or to meet.  
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compensate households. Increasing the level of payments received by low-income 
households with children is particularly effective at reducing poverty, with the 
reforms which include larger transfers to such households (A, F and G) leading to a 
0.2 percentage point reduction in poverty for adults and the population as a whole 
in addition to a 0.5 percentage point reduction in child poverty. Increasing the 
maximum personal rate of the main working-age welfare payments (Reform C) 
leads to a similar reduction in poverty amongst the overall and adult population, 
but a smaller 0.2 percentage point reduction in child poverty. These are sizeable 
effects. By means of reference, Regan and Maître (2020) estimate that the at-risk-
of-poverty rate for children could rise by 1.4 percentage points this year because 
of pandemic related job losses even with some recovery. 
 
TABLE 3.1  SIMULATED IMPACT OF €7.50 INCREASE IN CARBON TAX ON POVERTY MEASURES 
 Baseline With compensation package: 

















Energy poverty          
>10% AHC income 17.5 18.9 18.9 18.8 18.9 18.9 18.8 18.9 18.9 
>15% AHC income 5.6 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
>20% AHC income  3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
          
At-risk-of-poverty rate          
Population 14.1 14.1 13.9 14.1 13.9 14.1 14.1 13.9 13.9 
Adults 13.3 13.3 13.1 13.3 13.1 13.3 13.3 13.1 13.1 
Children 17.5 17.5 17.1 17.5 17.3 17.5 17.5 17.1 17.1 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH version 1.3. 
Note: Compensation packages as described in Chapter 2.  
 
The other reforms we consider – increasing the Fuel Allowance (B), increasing the 
personal income tax credit (D) and raising the Living Alone Increase (E) – have no 
effect on poverty. The reason for this is that few of those who benefit have incomes 
below but near the at-risk-of-poverty threshold.  
 
The results in this section show that it is possible to raise the carbon tax while 
reducing poverty – particularly for children – despite the likely rise the reforms 
would have on the official measure of energy poverty. We now turn to look at the 
distributional impact of the reforms considered above.  
3.2 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT 
In addition to concerns about the potential impacts of a higher carbon tax on 
poverty, the current government has committed to ‘ensuring that the increases in 
the carbon tax are progressive’. We therefore examine the progressivity of 
potential reforms considered above by assessing their net impact across the 
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distribution of income, dividing households into ten equally sized groups (deciles) 
on the basis of their disposable income adjusted for household size. 
 
Figure 3.1 plots the net gain or loss for these deciles as a percentage of disposable 
income, showing the average impact of the carbon tax rise without compensation 
alongside the four reforms considered above that lead to reductions in poverty 
(A, C, F and G). While the impact of the carbon tax increase is regressive without 
compensation – resulting in small losses of almost 0.3 per cent for the lowest-
income decile compared to negligible losses of 0.1 per cent for the highest income 
decile – each of these measures is sufficient to reverse the regressive distributional 
pattern. Indeed these reforms leave those in the lowest two income deciles on 
average slightly better-off, with gains of between 0.1 per cent and 0.3 per cent of 
disposable income. 
 
FIGURE 3.1  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF PROGRESSIVE CARBON TAX REFORMS  
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH version 1.3. 
Note: Deciles constructed equivalising income using the CSO’s ‘national’ equivalence scale. Gains/losses compared to 
baseline 2020 policy without any change in the carbon tax. Reforms as described in Chapter 2. 
 
Reforms A, F and G – which include increases in transfers to low-income 
households with children – are unambiguously progressive, with gains for the two 
or three lowest-income deciles and losses for higher-income deciles. Reform C – 
which increases the maximum personal rate of the main working-age welfare 
benefits – is also progressive, but with much larger gains for the second lowest 
rather than very lowest-income decile. The reason for this is that such increases 




























Decile of equivalised disposable income
No compensation Reform A Reform C Reform F Reform G
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without, and claimants with children are more likely to be located further down 
the income distribution. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the net distributional impact for the other reforms. While raising 
the Fuel Allowance (Reform B) or Living Alone Increase (Reform E) leaves those in 
the 3rd and 4th lowest-income decile on average better-off, neither provides 
significant compensation for those in the two lowest-income deciles. This is 
because most claimants of these benefits are retired single-adults or couples, and 
few of these are located in the very lowest-income deciles. Nor does increasing the 
personal income tax credit (Reform D), which mostly benefits higher income 
households. The reason is that the lowest-income deciles are more likely to be 
comprised of (recently) jobless working-age households who are not entitled to 
these payments and do not have high enough incomes to pay income tax. 
 
FIGURE 3.2  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF OTHER CARBON TAX REFORMS 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH version 1.3. 
Note: Deciles constructed equivalising income using the CSO’s ‘national’ equivalence scale. Gains/losses compared to baseline 2020 
policy without any change in the carbon tax. Reforms as described in Chapter 2.  
3.3 IMPACT ON OTHER GROUPS 
We now turn to look at the net impact of the reforms on the incomes of some 
other groups that may be of interest to policymakers. The columns in Table 3.1 
show the net gain/loss for each group as a percentage of disposable income, the 
first without any compensatory measures and the remainder for a €7.50 increase 




























Decile of equivalised disposable income
No compensation Reform B Reform D Reform E
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In terms of the impact across family types, the results suggest that an 
uncompensated carbon tax rise would have a slightly smaller effect on retired and 
working-age single adults than others. However, with the exception of raising the 
Fuel Allowance (Reform B, which leaves retired couples on average better-off) and 
increasing the maximum personal rate of the main working-age benefits 
(Reform C, which significantly mitigates losses for working-age couples without 
children), the measures we consider do little to benefit retired couples or working-
age couples without children, leaving them most adversely affected. The reason is 
that the measures we have examined for the most part benefit lower-income 
households who are at-risk-of-poverty. Couples without children – whether retired 
or of working-age – have experienced below-average rates of poverty in recent 
years. Retired couples, for example, have had an at-risk-of-poverty rate of below 
10 per cent consistently since 2015, compared to more than a third for working-
age single adults and lone parents (CSO, Table SIA16).  
 
TABLE 3.2  NET GAIN/LOSS AS A PERCENTAGE OF DISPOSABLE INCOME 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SWITCH version 1.3. 
Note: Gains/losses compared to 2020 policy without any change in the carbon tax. Reforms as described in Chapter 2. 
 
 Package of compensation measures 
 None % A % B % C % D % E % F % G % 
Family Type        
Working-age single -0.13 -0.12 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 
Working-age lone parent -0.16 0.08 -0.16 0.00 -0.12 -0.16 0.01 0.01 
Working-age couple, no kids -0.16 -0.14 -0.16 -0.09 -0.08 -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 
Working-age couple w/kids -0.16 -0.03 -0.16 -0.11 -0.08 -0.16 -0.06 -0.06 
Retired Single -0.14 -0.13 0.36 -0.11 -0.10 0.64 0.03 -0.02 
Retired Couple -0.17 -0.18 0.02 -0.15 -0.14 -0.17 -0.18 -0.13 
         
Rural/Urban        
Rural -0.18 -0.10 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 
Urban -0.13 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
         
Tenure         
Owned -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 -0.13 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 
Rented -0.11 0.07 -0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.06 
         
Household Size         
1 -0.14 -0.14 0.25 -0.06 -0.08 0.45 -0.02 -0.05 
2 -0.16 -0.15 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.16 -0.15 -0.13 
3 -0.15 -0.09 -0.15 -0.07 -0.08 -0.15 -0.10 -0.10 
4 -0.16 -0.08 -0.16 -0.10 -0.08 -0.16 -0.10 -0.10 
>5 -0.16 0.08 -0.16 -0.08 -0.09 -0.16 0.03 0.03 
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Working-age lone parents are left on average better-off by those reforms which 
raise Increases for Qualified Children (Reforms A, E and F), as are working-age 
single adults from increasing the maximum personal rate of the main working-age 
social welfare benefits (Reform C). Similarly, retired singles are left on average 
better-off by reforms (E and F) which raise the Living Alone Increase. Finally, 
although they are not left on average better-off by any reform, those which raise 
Increases for Qualified Children (A, E and F) significantly mitigate losses for 
working-age couples with children, with those on lower-incomes benefiting most. 
 
In terms of geographic impact, an increase in the carbon tax would 
disproportionately affect those living in rural areas, with or without any 
compensation measures. However, as Bercholz and Roantree (2019) showed, this 
is driven by the particularly large effects on those living in rural areas who 
commute long distances to work by car. Given the ongoing pandemic and public 
health advice to work from home where possible, such differential impacts may be 
moderated by a reduction in long-distance commuting by car. 
 
Owner-occupiers would also be more adversely affected by the increase in carbon 
tax, with or without compensation. Renters – both in the private and social sector 
– would be left on average better-off by those measures which raised the personal 
rate of working-age benefit payments or Increases for Qualified Children (Reforms 
A, C, E and F). This is because those renting are disproportionately likely to be in 
receipt of a social welfare payment. 
 
Finally, Table 3.1 shows that while the impact of an uncompensated increase in the 
carbon tax is broadly similar across small and large households, the compensation 
measures have very different effects. Reforms which include raising Increases for 
Qualified Children (A, F and G) would leave 5+ person households on average 
better-off while those that involve increasing the Fuel Allowance or Living Alone 
Increase (B and E) would leave single adult households better off.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Retrofitting 
The Programme for Government also proposes allocating €5 billion from the 
€9.5 billion in additional revenue that will be raised by increases to the carbon tax 
to part fund a ‘socially progressive national [housing] retrofitting programme’. The 
expansion of existing support programmes for residential energy efficiency 
retrofits will help address a significant challenge for the residential sector of 
substantially reducing its emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). Currently, in excess of 
6 million tonnes per annum, or a 15 per cent share of total national CO2 emissions, 
are linked to the residential sector.15 Improvements in building energy efficiency 
should lead to a reduction in fuel consumption necessary to heat homes. Where a 
carbon tax is an incentive to curtail fossil fuel consumption (and choose low-carbon 
alternatives), a retrofit grant scheme is an incentive to reduce the quantity of 
energy necessary to heat homes (and thereby reduce the level of carbon taxation 
where fossil fuels are consumed). The equity impacts of the combined effects of 
both a carbon tax increase and an expanded national housing retrofitting 
programme are much more difficult to discern. The Sustainable Energy Authority 
of Ireland (SEAI) already administers energy efficiency retrofit schemes targeted at 
families across the income distribution. A relevant policy question is the extent to 
which such schemes are equitable in terms of access and benefits? Equally 
important is understanding what will be the return on €5 billion public investment 
in residential energy efficiency? Will it be enough to deliver on Climate Action Plan 
commitments in relation to home retrofits, and ultimately what will be the impact 
on fuel consumption and emissions? Prior research on existing retrofit 
programmes administered by the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI) 
provides some insight on these issues. 
4.1 HOME RETROFITS: SCOPE AND DEPTH 
An issue with all government support schemes is understanding who avails of the 
support and whether the recipients are broadly representative of the target 
audience. Based on the Climate Action Plan, the policy aim is for housing units to 
upgrade to Building Energy Rating (BER) B2 standard. Overall, the Irish residential 
building stock has a relatively low energy efficiency. Over half of the Irish 
residential building stock is below C3 grade and over one-quarter of properties are 
classified within the four lowest energy efficiency grades, so the potential target 
audience of properties for the grant programme is quite broad.16 Not only does the 
housing stock have a relatively low energy efficiency, there is a correlation 




15  See spreadsheet download associated with EPA report Ireland’s Final Greenhouse Gas Emissions 1990-2018 at 
http://www.epa.ie/pubs/reports/air/airemissions/ghg2018. 
16  See Table 15 of the CSO’s Domestic Building Energy Ratings statistics, available at 
https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/dber/domesticbuildingenergyratingsquarter22020. 
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types. People living in the four lowest energy efficiency grades, comprising grades 
E1, E2, F and G, are more likely to be older (75+), disabled or have no occupants in 
gainful employment (Curtis et al., 2015). Furthermore, rental properties – 
especially low value rentals – have a higher likelihood of being in the EFG 
categories, many of which are in public sector ownership (ibid). Any expansion in 
the grant programmes needs to be mindful that the most energy inefficient 
properties are owned or occupied by families with limited financial resources. 
 
The presence of energy efficiency grant schemes encourages engagement in 
retrofit activities but not universally across the housing stock. The design of the 
grant scheme itself may represent barriers to engagement. For example, applicants 
to the Better Energy Homes scheme between 2009 and 2015 seeking to undertake 
‘deeper’ retrofits are more likely to abandon their application, possibly due to 
administrative and logistical burdens (Collins and Curtis, 2017). Even where 
retrofits are cost free to the occupants and managed by the landlord, a fraction of 
rental tenants are reluctant to participate in home retrofits that ultimately will 
provide benefits to the tenants in terms of improved comfort and lower energy 
costs (Coyne et al., 2018). However, preliminary findings of ongoing research at 
ESRI related to the Better Energy Warmer Homes, which is a 100 per cent funded 
retrofit grant scheme for qualifying disadvantaged households, finds that the 
probability of abandonment of a retrofit application declines as the intensity of 
retrofit increases. 
4.2 HOME ENERGY RETROFIT COSTS 
There is no simple answer to the question of how much an energy efficiency 
retrofit costs. It varies depending on the number of retrofit measures installed, the 
building type, the existing energy efficiency status, and the size of the property, 
among other factors. Data from existing grant schemes provide some insight on 
average costs. For example, Table 4.1 outlines mean retrofit costs for some 
selected retrofit measures. Data on costs for other measures are not publicly 
available, though the measures included in Table 4.1 represent approximately 
25 per cent of retrofit grants within the Better Energy Homes scheme, while the 
combination of attic and cavity insulation represents a further 50 per cent of grants 
(Mac Uidhir et al., 2020).  
 
What is noticeable from the Better Energy Homes data is that most retrofits can 
be categorised as shallow rather than deep retrofits. For instance, over 90 per cent 
of grant applications are for one or two measures only (Collins and Curtis, 2016; 
2017), and just over 50 per cent are for attic and cavity insulation (Mac Uidhir et 
al., 2020). While the figures in Table 4.1 provide indicative costs of specific retrofit 
measure combinations, the scale of cost associated with achieving a B2 BER status 
is likely to be substantially higher. Within the Better Energy Homes scheme, the 
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mean cost per unit BER improvement (incl. grant) is €72.60/kWh/m2/year across 
all retrofit measures, property types, and property sizes (Collins and Curtis, 2017). 
Using this as a rule of thumb, the estimated cost of upgrading a property from the 
E, F or G BER grades to B2 status could exceed €18,000, though likely to be 
substantially higher.17 Across 461 homes retrofitted within the SEAI’s Deep Retrofit 
Pilot Programme retrofits, the average cost to upgrade a home from an average 
BER rating of F to an average A3 rating is €58,722.18 
 
TABLE 4.1  MEAN RETROFIT COSTS, BETTER ENERGY HOMES (SELECTED MEASURES) 
 Number of Households  
BER Improvement 
kWh/m2/yr 
Total cost of retrofit 
€ 
Boiler with Heating Controls* 21,535 96 3,456 
Heating Controls only 2,346 55 1,500 
Solar Collector 3,800 34 5,897 
Boiler w/ Heating Con., Solar* 376 99 8,452 
Heating Controls, Solar 397 56 7,066 
 
Source: Collins and Curtis (2018) based on Better Energy Homes administrative data.  
Note: * Fossil fuel boiler replacement grants under the Better Energy Homes scheme have been discontinued. 
4.3 CHANGES IN HOME ENERGY EFFICIENCY, ENERGY USE AND 
EMISSIONS 
While energy efficiency retrofit programmes are primarily policy responses to 
energy efficiency and climate emissions targets, they have wider social benefits, 
particularly with respect to improving living conditions. Energy efficiency retrofit 
programmes can potentially reduce the incidence of energy poverty, though as 
discussed in Chapter 3 and argued by Watson and Maître (2015), there is a strong 
case that energy poverty is not a distinct type of deprivation in Ireland and that ‘its 
solution lies in understanding and addressing the constellation of factors that 
erode a household’s material well-being’ more generally. Additionally, Tovar-
Reaños and Lynch (2020) find that expenditure-based energy poverty metrics 
perform poorly both in measuring baseline rates of energy poverty and in capturing 
any changes to energy poverty from carbon taxation.  
 
Irrespective of the merits of energy efficiency retrofit grants on alleviating energy 
poverty, it is instructive to assess the impact of energy efficiency measures on 
energy use and associated emissions. In practice there is not an equivalent 
improvement in energy consumption (and emissions) following an energy 
efficiency enhancement due to the rebound effect, defined by Sorrell et al. (2009) 




17  The rule of thumb calculation assumes the efficacy of individual measures within shallow retrofits, on which the cost 
figures are estimated, will be the same in deep retrofits. This is unlikely to be the case as the marginal cost of achieving 
BER improvements is likely to be substantially higher as the BER value (kWh/m2/year) declines. 
18   See https://www.seai.ie/grants/home-energy-grants/deep-retrofit-grant/key-findings. 
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savings’ achieved by the energy efficiency upgrade’. A rebound in energy 
consumption can be attributed to several reasons, including the difference 
between actual savings and those predicted from engineering models; a change in 
mean internal temperature after retrofit; and due to changes in user behaviour. In 
many instances rebound effects may reflect prior deprivations, such as inadequate 
heating, and therefore rebound effects are desirable policy outcomes (Ryan and 
Campbell, 2012). 
 
Very little work has been undertaken to quantify the energy consumption and 
emissions impact of the existing energy efficiency retrofit schemes in Ireland. 
Properties in receipt of a retrofit grant must report on measured BER 
improvement, from which associated estimated energy savings can be calculated, 
as illustrated in Table 4.2. In the case of 461 ‘deep’ retrofits, SEAI report the 
improvement in BER rating from an average of 414 kWh/m2/year (F rated band) to 
52 kWh/m2/year (A3 grade).19 
 
 
TABLE 4.2  ENERGY SAVINGS (KWH/M2/YEAR) BY ARCHETYPE AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY RETROFIT 
COMBINATION 
 Apartment Terraced House Detached House 
 AB CD EFG AB CD EFG AB CD EFG 
Cavity & Attic insulation  7 34 78 15 35 106 13 33 105 
Boiler with heating controls  27 61 156 21 70 136 20 66 137 
External wall insulation  – 49 138 20 61 115 36 60 129 
Solar thermal  25 39 135 15 34 61 12 28 45 
Attic, Cavity & Boiler with 
heating controls 27 87 212 19 70 167 21 67 160 
 
Source: Table 8, Mac Uidhir et al. (2020). 
 
However, the estimates like those in Table 4.2 are based on engineering models 
and do not reflect differences from standardised assumptions about occupancy 
and use, nor rebound effects. Consistent overestimation by engineering models of 
energy-saving benefits are due to inaccurate modelling assumptions, poor retrofit 
installations, or behavioural change by occupants (O’Callaghan et al., 2020). Only a 
small number of studies in Ireland are based on measured changes in energy 
consumption. Scheer et al. (2018) in a study of metered gas use by just 210 
households following home energy retrofits find a 21 per cent reduction in gas 
consumption. The associated retrofits predominantly comprise roof and wall 
insulation, and/or boiler upgrades. Improvements in energy efficiency are from a 
mean BER of E1 to C3, equivalent to 100 kWh/m2/year. The mean gas consumption 




19   See https://www.seai.ie/grants/home-energy-grants/deep-retrofit-grant/key-findings. 
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Scheer et al. (2018) study relates to owner-occupied housing, Beagon et al. (2018) 
estimate a 14 per cent reduction in gas consumption following deep energy 
efficiency retrofits by a social housing landlord. A separate study in a social housing 
setting find 23 per cent and 12 per cent reductions in gas and electricity 
consumption across 20 households following energy efficiency retrofits (Rau et al., 
2020). Across these three Irish empirical studies there is considerable variability in 
the measured impacts on energy consumption and in all three cases the underlying 
data samples are quite small so it is difficult to extrapolate the findings to estimate 
the change in energy consumption due to an expanded retrofit programme within 
the wider stock of either social or private housing. Furthermore, these studies have 
focused on networked fuels only. The impact on solid fuel consumption, which can 
be in excess of one-third of total energy expenditure, on average, within Irish 
households (Curtis and Pentecost, 2015), has not been considered. Coyne et al. 
(2018) note that while many social housing households reduced their use of 
secondary fuels following retrofit, self-reported purchases of coal and other fuels 
remained surprisingly high in the first year post retrofit. This suggests that 
households may need some time to gauge the thermal efficiency impact of retrofits 
and adopt new energy use behaviours. Both Scheer et al. (2018) and Coyne et al. 
(2018) estimate the shortfall between actual energy savings and technical 
potential savings based on engineering models, in social and private housing 
contexts. The shortfall in the private housing sample is 36 per cent compared to 67 
per cent (i.e. a lower level of energy savings) among the social housing sample. 
These findings caution against using ex-ante engineering models to estimate 
potential energy use savings but also suggest that the impact on energy 
consumption is likely to exhibit substantial variance across the housing stock. 
 
Current grant schemes, particularly where there is applicant co-funding, are 
designed to cover a percentage of the total cost of retrofitting. Grants are 
essentially provided for the purchase and installation of equipment and materials, 
irrespective of the net energy efficiency outcome. This leads to significant variation 
in the level of grant aid provided relative to the energy efficiency improvement 
gained. Across five years of the Better Energy Home scheme, grant aid per unit 
energy efficiency improvement ranges from €0.62/kWh/m2/year to 
€4,545/kWh/m2/year with a mean of €20.96/kWh/m2/year (Collins and Curtis, 
2017). Using this as a metric, some grants constitute relatively poor value for 
money from the perspective of the Exchequer. Mac Uidhir et al. (2020) 
demonstrate that households systematically do not prioritise the most energy 
efficient retrofit measures when upgrading their homes, suggesting that efficiency 
gains of up to 86 per cent can be achieved with alternative retrofit choices. 
Incentives within retrofit grant schemes should be aligned such that award of grant 
aid is based on verified energy efficiency improvement, i.e. improvement in BER 
rating. Such an approach may encourage more considered investment and avoid 
measures that may be unnecessary from an energy efficiency perspective. 
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None of the studies cited above consider the impact of an energy efficiency retrofit 
on household energy expenditure. Curtis and Pentecost (2015) examine fuel 
expenditure levels across households with different BER ratings. They estimate 
that each one point improvement along the 15-point BER scale is associated with 
a 1.6 per cent reduction in energy expenditure. In absolute terms, mean energy 
expenditure savings per BER increment are €30, though range between €2 and 
€636 per annum. This estimate refers to expenditure on all fuels (i.e. gas, oil, 
electricity and solid fuels). On a proportionate basis the reduction in expenditure 
is less that the reduction in single fuel use (e.g. gas) from the studies cited above.  
For instance, when applying the methodology from Curtis and Pentecost (2015) to 
a change in BER rating from E1 to C3, i.e. the mean BER improvement in Scheer et 
al. (2018), the estimate of associated difference in gas expenditure is -9 per cent, 
while the difference in expenditure on all fuels is -5 per cent, both substantially 
lower than the -21 per cent in gas consumption in Scheer et al. (2018). One possible 
explanation is that the Curtis and Pentecost (2015) analysis is based on a large 
nationally representative sample of households (N=5,872) undertaken by the 
Central Statistics Office, whereas the studies cited above are based on small, 
unrepresentative samples (N<210). 
 
As the studies by Scheer et al. (2018), Beagon et al. (2018) and Rau et al. (2020) 
estimate changes in gas consumption levels, and electricity in the case of Rau et al. 
(2020), the proportionate changes in CO2 emissions for these fuels are the same as 
for fuel consumption. Separate from the issue that these estimates might not be 
representative of the wider housing stock, the estimates relate to a single energy 
source rather that total household emissions. During energy efficiency retrofits, 
not only are heating systems upgraded but some households switch heating fuels. 
For example, in a survey of heating system upgrades, 19 per cent of those switching 
to an oil-fired system had previously used solid fuels (i.e. coal or peat), whereas 
those switching to gas, 37 per cent had previously used oil or solid fuels (Curtis et 
al., 2018). Fuel switching in the context of heating system or energy efficiency 
retrofits can lead to substantial emission savings (Curtis et al., 2020; McCoy and 
Curtis, 2018). In the context of available evidence from existing energy efficiency 
retrofit programmes it is not possible to estimate the impact on net CO2 emissions 
from households. To have a good understanding of how energy efficiency retrofits 
impact on fuel demand, expenditure and emissions necessitates a broad-based 
study across different housing types (e.g. apartments, terraced, houses), building 
vintages, and occupant characteristics (e.g. owner/rental, urban/rural, income, 
occupational status, etc). Most studies to date have been limited in scale, partly 
due to the difficulty in accessing suitable samples. Consideration should be given 
to developing a large bespoke research dataset that can be used to inform policy 
development by combining administrative datasets on energy use (e.g. utility bills) 
with data on building attributes and occupant characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined how the Irish carbon tax can be raised without 
disproportionately affecting low-income households and increasing poverty. It 
showed that poverty can in fact be reduced and the lowest-income fifth of 
households left better-off using a third of revenues from a carbon tax rise on 
targeted increases in welfare payments, as proposed in the recent Programme for 
Government. This reverses the regressive impact of an uncompensated carbon tax 
rise, which arises because goods subject to the carbon tax make up a larger share 
of spending for lower- than higher-income households. 
 
The lowest-income fifth of households is heavily comprised of working-age adults 
in receipt of social welfare payments and their dependents. These can be 
compensated for a rise in the carbon tax through increases in the maximum rates 
of the main working-age welfare payments, or raising Increases for Qualified 
Children (IQCs) paid alongside these benefits to those with dependent children. 
We show that doing so using a third of the €159 million Revenue estimate a 
€7.50 per tonne carbon tax increase raises would reduce the overall poverty rate 
by 0.2 percentage points (ppts) and leave the lowest-income fifth of households 
on average better-off. Using the revenue to increase IQCs would reduce the child 
poverty rate by twice that (0.4ppts): a substantial reduction given Regan and 
Maître (2020) estimate child poverty could rise by 1.4ppts this year because of 
pandemic related job losses, even with some recovery.  
 
Policymakers may also be concerned about the impact an uncompensated carbon 
tax rise will have on single adults living alone. Using a third of revenues to raise the 
Fuel Allowance or Living Alone Increase is well targeted at compensating such 
households, though would not on its own reverse the regressive impact of a carbon 
tax rise. This is because much of the gain from such benefits go to households 
around the middle rather than the bottom of the income distribution, reflected in 
lower rates of poverty among retired adults than working-age adults or children. 
However, using one-third of the revenue to fund a combined increase in IQCs and 
these benefits would be both progressive and poverty reducing. 
 
There will of course still be some who lose under the reforms examined in this 
paper, even among those groups that are left on average better-off. Such impacts 
are inevitable with any tax reform and while ultimately it is a political decision as 
to who should gain and who should lose, this paper provides evidence on how such 
impacts can be mitigated and even offset using just a third of revenues raised by a 
carbon tax rise. It does so using the latest version of SWITCH – the ESRI’s tax and 
benefit microsimulation model – which has been updated so that the sample of 
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households it runs on is representative of the 2020 population post-COVID related 
job losses. Previous work has shown that the same outcome can be achieved in 
more normal times without exhausting revenues raised by the tax, through a 
combination of social welfare increases and tax cuts (Bercholz and Roantree, 2019; 
Tovar-Reaños and Lynch, 2019; Callan et al., 2009; Healy, 2003; Clinch and Healy, 
2000).  
 
The government has proposed allocating most of the remaining revenue raised by 
increases to the carbon tax towards a housing energy efficiency retrofit 
programme. While this spending is likely to reduce household energy consumption 
– particularly for those in the least energy efficient houses – based on existing 
research it is difficult to assess the likely impacts in terms of energy consumption, 
emissions, or the equity implications of spending an additional €5 billion on energy 
efficiency retrofits. Research evidence based on existing energy efficiency grant 
schemes is that grant schemes do encourage people to invest in their homes, and 
that energy efficiency improves but there is significant variation in the level of 
grant aid provided relative to the energy efficiency gain. An additional €5 billion 
allocation to residential energy efficiency is considerable but the cost of noticeably 
improving the energy efficiency of the housing stock (the policy aim within the 
Climate Action Plan is to achieve a B2 BER standard) is likely to be many multiples 
higher (and co-funded by homeowners).  It is important that incentives for 
homeowners within a grant scheme be aligned with policy objectives, i.e. grant 
payments in lieu of measured improvements in energy efficiency.  Improvements 
in energy efficiency will reduce energy consumption and associated emissions but 
there is limited research to quantify the likely differences across building types, 
construction standards, regional variations and socio-economic dimensions, 
including income. It would be prudent that evaluation of grant programme 
effectiveness, including collection of relevant information to enable strong 
quantitative assessments, be incorporated into new programme funding. 
Allocating just a small fraction of the proposed budget for ongoing evaluation of 
the programme would help ensure the programme can continually evolve to 
maximise efficiency gains. 
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APPENDIX  
 
TABLE A.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR REPORTED AND SIMULATED FUEL EXPENDITURE (€/WEEK) 
 Gas Liquid Solid Petrol Diesel Total 
Mean       
HBS 7.21 8.43 5.00 17.26 16.97 54.87 
SILC 7.10 9.16 4.82 17.20 16.52 54.80 
       
Variance       
HBS 176.74 273.26 181.07 607.03 977.84 2,094.95 
SILC 114.24 146.21 45.46 398.66 601.01 1,890.12 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey, 2017 Survey of Incomes and Living Conditions and 
SWITCH version 1.3.  
 
 
TABLE A.2 MEAN REPORTED AND SIMULATED SPENDING ON FUELS (€/WEEK), SELECTED GROUPS 
 Category Gas Liquid Solid Petrol Diesel Total 
Tenure 
HBS Owned 7.23 10.18 5.51 18.32 20.49 61.74 
 Rented 7.32 3.51 3.59 14.48 7.26 36.17 
 Other 3.90 7.77 4.30 12.27 11.90 40.13 
  
      
SILC Owned 7.05 11.07 5.45 18.24 19.29 61.10 
 Rented 7.06 3.11 3.91 12.94 6.36 33.38 
 Other 5.18 4.91 1.31 15.62 12.04 39.05 
Household size 
HBS 1 5.26 6.79 4.23 9.06 5.36 30.69 
 2 7.01 9.05 5.86 16.95 13.89 52.77 
 3 7.57 7.91 5.06 20.50 21.23 62.28 
 4 8.94 9.09 4.14 21.88 23.99 68.02 
 5+ 8.54 9.66 5.30 22.68 30.75 76.92 
  
      
SILC 1 3.93 6.35 3.51 7.98 4.83 26.61 
 2 6.34 10.58 5.99 16.44 15.37 54.72 
 3 9.31 9.55 5.60 22.10 23.37 69.93 
 4 10.18 10.17 4.97 25.56 25.90 76.78 
 5+ 9.98 11.07 5.62 25.23 27.97 79.86 
Rural/Urban 
HBS Rural 9.61 5.97 3.78 16.65 11.95 47.96 
 Urban 1.78 14.02 7.75 18.63 28.38 70.56 
  
      
SILC Rural 10.44 6.49 3.78 16.32 11.53 48.55 
 Urban 1.43 13.47 6.98 18.11 23.89 63.89 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey, 2017 Survey of Incomes and Living Conditions 
and SWITCH version 1.3.  
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TABLE A.3  REPORTED AND SIMULATED CARBON TAX LIABILITIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF 














1 0.08 0.19 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.83 
2 0.06 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.58 
3 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.48 
4 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.45 
5 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.41 
6 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.40 
7 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.34 
8 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.31 
9 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.26 
10 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.19 
All 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.43 
SILC 
1 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.82 
2 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.56 
3 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.51 
4 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.55 
5 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.53 
6 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.51 
7 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.46 
8 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.42 
9 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.34 
10 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.24 
All 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.50 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the 2015-2016 Household Budget Survey, 2017 Survey of Incomes and Living Conditions 
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